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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE VALIDITY OF THE ACTS OF UNRECOGNIZED
DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS IN THE COURTS
OF NON-RECOGNIZING STATESt
By N. D. HOUGHTON*
I
IN GENERAL
N the ordinary course of their operations the courts of a coun-
try are frequently called upon to interpret and give applica-
tion to the laws and governmental acts of other states. It may
happen, therefore, that the laws and acts of an unrecognized
foreign government may come before the courts, and in such
cases it becomes necessary that the question of the legal status
of such laws and acts, within the jurisdiction of the court, be
determined. It may also occur that the validity of the laws and
governmental acts of a defunct insurrectionary government may
have to be determined by the courts of the victorfous de jure
government. Cases involving the former consideration have been
before the courts of a number of countries, including those of
the United States, in connection with the acts of the Russian
Soviet Government, and cases of the latter sort arose especially
pointedly in the courts of the United States with respect to the
acts of the Confederate governments, central and state.
THE VALIDITY OF THE LAWS AND GOVERNMENTAL AcTs or THE
SEVERAL CONFEDERATE STATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
From apparent uncertainty as to their validity, the govern-
ments in all the seceding southern states, after the Civil War,
passed ordinances or laws either declaring al laws passed by the
insurrectionary governments void, with whatever exceptions they
saw fit to make, or adopting them all, except certain ones, which
it was not seen fit to adopt.' But the question of the validity
of the acts of those governments was not to be so readily disposed
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona.
tFor a discussion of the principles governing the recognition of de
facto governments, see Stinson, Recognition of De Facto Governments
and the Responsibility of States, 9 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1. See also
Houghton, N. D., Recognition in International Law, 62 An. L. Rez. 228.
(Ed.)
'See Keith v. Clark, (1878) 97 U. S. 454, 24 L. Ed. 1071, the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley.
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of, and it came before the United States courts in a number of
cases, elicitmg some rather definite judicial statements as to the
kinds of acts to which validity should be attributed and those
which, from their nature, were deemed to have been of no legal
effect.
In the case of Texas v. White,2 decided in 1869, the United
States Supreme Court stated, with reference to the government
of Texas, which was established in 1862 and operated during the
period of the Civil War, that:
"It-may be said, perhaps with sufficient accuracy, that acts
necessary to peace and good order among citizens, such, for ex-
ample, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and the do-
mestic relations, govermng the course of descents, regulating the
conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and pro-
viding remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar
acts, which would be valid if emanating from a lawful govern-
ment, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from
an actual, though unlawful government; and that acts in further-
ance or support of rebellion against the United' States, or intended
to defeat the just rights of citizens, and other acts of like nature,
must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void." 3
And, in the case of Horn v. Lockhart,' in 1873, the Supreme
Court stated.
"We admit that the acts of the several [Confederate] states
in their individual capacities, and of their different departments
of government, executive, judicial, and legislative, during the War,
so far as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of
the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the con-
stitution, are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. The
existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or regular ad-
ministration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regu-
lations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts
enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer
and descent of property regulated precisely as in time of peace.
No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of
judicial5 or legislative acts in the insurrectionary states touching
2(1869) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 700, 10 L. Ed. 227
3See also Shortridge v. Macon, (C.C.N.C. 1867) Chase 136, Fed.
Cas. No. 12, 812.
4(1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 570, 21 L. Ed. 657.5The judicial proceedings of the courts of the insurrectionary states
were generally held to be valid, unless in direct aid of the rebellion. See
French v. Tumlin, (1871) Fed. Cas. No. 5,104; Hill v. Arnistead, (1876)
56 Ala. 118; Pepin v. Lochenmeyer, (1871) 45 N. Y. 27 Though the
supreme court of Arkansas, under authority of the constitution of 1868.
held judgments of the courts of that state, acting under authority of the
insurrectionary constitution absolutely null and void. Penn v.
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these and kindred subjects where they were not hostile in their
purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the national
government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
constitution."6
THE VALIDITY OF THE LAWS AND ACTS OF THE CONFEDERATE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES
The laws and acts of the Confederate Central Government,
however, as distinguished from those of the governments of the
several seceded states, were held to have no legal effect, and
hence to give rise to no rights which were entitled to judicial
recognition in the courts of the United States after the fall of
the Confederacy In the case of Ford v Surget it was held
that a statute passed by the Confederate Congress could have, as
an act of legislation, "no force whatever in any court recognizing
the federal constitution as the supreme law of the land."
In the case of Hickman v Jones,8 the United States Supreme
Court held the act of the Confederate Congress providing for a
system of Confederate district courts to be void.
"It was," said the court, "as if it were not. The court was a
nullity, and could exercise no rightful jurisdiction. The forms of
law with which it clothed its proceedings -gave no protection to
those who, assuming to be its officers, were the instruments by
which it acted.""
And, in the case of Sprott v United States,1" the Supreme
Court pointed out that
"The recognition of the existence and the validity of the acts
of the so-called Confederate Government, and that of the states"
which yielded a temporary support to that government stand on
very different considerations. The latter, in most, if not in all in-
Tollison, (1871) 26 Ark. 545. And the supreme court of West Virginia
held judgment of the insurrectionary courts ot Virginia, in cases which
had been started before the secession, to be void. See Snider v. Snider,
(1869) 3 W Va. 200; Stephens v. Brown, (1884) 24 W Va. 234.6See also 44 American Digest, Cent. Ed., 1964 ff., and Williams v.
Bruffy, (1878) 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716.
7(1878) 97 U. S. 594, 24 L. Ed. 1018.
8(1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 197, 19 L. Ed. 551.
Ojones, who had been judge of the Confederate district court for
the northern district of Louisiana, and other officers of the court, were
held liable for damages for detention and prosecution of the plaintiff
on charges of treason against the Confederate Government during the
Civil War, though he had been acquitted of the treason charges
originally.
10(1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 459, 22 L. Ed. 371.
"Italics, the author's.
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stances, merely transferred the existing state organizations to the
support of a new and different national head. The same constitu-
tions, the same laws for the protection of property and personal
rights remained and were admimstered by the same officers."
Submitting that the laws of the states embodied "the fundamental
principles for which civil society is organized into government
in all countries," and that they "must be iespected in their ad-
mistration under whatever temporary dominant authority they
may be exercised," the court stated that: "It is only when in the
use of these powers, substantial aid and comfort was given or
intended to be given to the rebellion, that the acts are void."
But, it was held that:
"The [Central] Government of the Confederate States can
receive no aid from tis source of reasoning. It had no existence,
except as a conspiracy to overthrow lawful authority Its founda-
tion was treason against the existing federal government. Its
single purpose, so long as it lasted, was to make that treason suc-
cessful. So far from being necessary to the organization of civil
government, or to its maintenance and support, it was inimical to
social order, destructive to the best interests of society, and its
primary object was to overthrow the Government on which these
so largely depended. When it was overthrown it perished
totally It left no laws, no statutes, no decrees, no authority which
can give support to any contract, or any act done in its service,
or in aid of its purpose, or wich contributed to protract its ex-
istence."'.2
Thus the basis upon which the court, in the earlier cases,
held the acts of the Confederate central government to be in-
valid was the principle that all acts in aid or support of the in-
surrection were void.13 This principle was also relied upon in
the case of Dewung v. Perdicartes,7 decided in January, 1878,
in which acts of sequestration of shares of stock by the Con-
federate government were held to be invalid, the court pointing
out that, "nothing is better settled in the jurisprudence of this
court than that all acts done in aid of the rebellion were illegal
and of no validity The principle has become axiomatic."
But, in the case of Williams v. Bruffy,25 decided in March,
12See also Keppel v. Petersburg R. Co., (C.C.Va. 1868), Chase 167,
Fed. Cas. No. 7722.
13See Texas v. White, (1869) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 700. 19 L. Ed. 227;
Hickman v. Jones, (1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 197, 19 L Ed. 551, Hanauer
v. Doane, (1871) 12 WalL (U.S.) 342, 20 L. Ed. 439; Hanauer v. Wood-
ruff, (1873) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 439, 21 L. Ed. 224.
14(1878) 96 U. S. 193, 24 L. Ed. 654.
15(1878) 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716.
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1878, the court announced a new constitutional and legal basis
for holding the acts of the Confederate Government invalid. The
invalidity of its acts was here based,
1. Upon the principle of the illegal existence of the Con-
federate Government, as having been in specific violation of
article I, section X, of the United States constitution, which
declares that, "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation ;"16
2. Upon the fact that "The United States, during the
whole contest, never for one moment renounced their claun to
supreme jurisdiction over the whole country," nor, "acknowl-
edged in any form, or through any of their departments, the law-
fulness of the rebellious organization or the validity of any of
its acts ,'17 and,
3. Upon the fact that the Confederate Government failed
of ultimate success.'
8
THE VALIDITY OF THE LAWS AND DECREES OF THE RUSSIAN
SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE COURTS OF EUROPEAN
STATES, PRIOR TO RECOGNITION
In the case of Luther v Sagor,19 the King's Bench Division
of the British High Court of Justice refused, in 1920, to give
any legal effect to the nationalization decrees of the Russian
Soviet Government, on the ground that that government had
not been recognized by Great Britain. But the decision was re-
versed by the Court of Appeal 0 in 1921, after the British Gov-
ernment had recognized the Soviet Government as the de facto
government of Russia."
26Its illegality as an insurrectionary organization had been previous-
ly asserted, in Sprott v. United Sta;es, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 459, 22 L.
Ed. 371. See above, note 10.
17 See also Ford v. Surget, (1878) 97 U. S. 594, 24 L. Ed. 1018, de-
cided in November after the Bruffy decision in March, 1878.
s1it should be pointed out that the court, for the purpose of get-
ting jurisdiction in the Bruffy case, recognized that an act of the Con-
federate central government which had been sanctioned and enforced
by the Confederate state government of Virginia, was thereby given
legality to the extent of permitting an appeal from a decision of the
Virginia courts under the terms of the Judiciary Act of 1867 The
court said, "Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which
a state gives the force of law, is a statute of the state, within the
meaning of the clause cited [from the Judiciary Act of 1867] relating
to the jurisdiction of this court [in matters of constitutionality of state
laws]."
29[1921] 1 K. B. 456, 90 L. J. K. B. 1202.
20[1921] 3 K. B. 532, 90 L. J. K. B. 1210.
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The French courts, likewise, refused to give any legal effect
to the laws and decrees of the Soviet Government, prior to recog-
nition by the French Government, on the ground that the Soviet
Government had not been recognized, =2 and continued to apply the
laws of the Imperial Government in cases involving the applica-
tion of Russian law. 23  But, it appears that the German courts
do not concern themselves with the question of the recognition or
the non-recognition of a government in a foreign state as a factor
in the application of the law of such a government. They inquire
only as to what the law actually is in the foreign state. When that
is determined, the law which is actually in force is applied by Ger-
man courts when an occasion arises for its application, provided
the law is not contrary to international law, nor to German law,
nor injurious to the German morals and public order. This is the
policy which German courts pursued toward the laws of the Soviet
Government, treating them just as they would have treated the
same laws passed by a recognized Russian Government.2 -
21
-The Court of Appeal held the nationalization decrees issued in
1918 to be valid as the acts of the government of a sovereign state,
brushing aside the contention that the decrees should be considered
illegal as "contrary to essential principles of Justice and morality."
Moreover, in a bit of rather pointed dictum, Scrutton, L. J., stated that,
"Individuals must contribute to the welfare of the state, and at present
.British citizens who may contribute to the state more than half their
income in income tax and super tax, and a large proportion of their
capital in death duties, can hardly declare a foreign State immoral
which considers (though we may think wrongly) that to vest individual
property in the state as representing all the citizens is the best form of
property right."
See also Idelson, V R., "La Revolution Bolchevique et de Statut
Juiidique des Russes: Le point de vue de la jurisprudence anglaise,"
51 Journal du Droit Int. 28.
See also Dickinson, E. D., "The Unrecognized Government or State
in English and American Law," 22 Mich. L. Rev. 29, 118, and the same
article in 4 Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee.
3d Series, 145. For a decision of the French Tribunal de Commerce
in Marseilles of April 23, 1925, holding the Soviet Nationalization de-
crees to be of no force in France because contrary to the "ordre pub-
lique", see Etat Russe v. Cie Russe de Navigation a vapeur et de com-
Imerce (Ropit), 52 Journal du Droit International 392. But see Com-
pagnie d'assurance reume et "Le Phenix Espagnol" v. Sjewernoje
Strachowoje Obschtschestvo (1925), discussed in 75 U. S. of Pa. L.
Rev. 395.22 See Vlasto v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, reported in 50 Journal
du Droit International 933 (1922), and Optorg v. Bunitian, (1924) 18
Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law 88.2 3For a full presentation of the matter, see Grouber, A., and
Tager, P., "La Revolution Bolchevique et le Statut Juridique des
Russes: Le point de vue de Ia Jurisprudence francatse," 51 Journal du
Droit International 8.24See Freund, M., "La Revolution Bolchevique et le Statut Juridi-
que des Russes: Le point de vue de la Jurisprudence allemande", 51
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THE VALIDITY OF THE SOVIET DECREES IN THE COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES
The question of the validity of the Soviet nationalization
decrees of 1918 has come before the courts of the United States
in a number of cases. In so far, however, as the matter is consid-
ered at this point, the cases here discussed are cases in which the
invalidity of the decrees is urged as a basis of private rights, ad-
mittedly existing before the decrees were issued, and in which the
validity of the decrees is relied upon as a defense against actions
where liability was clear before the decrees were issued. That is
to say, the cases here considered do not require the courts to con-
cede legal validity to the nationalization decrees in order to arrive
at just decisions. They are, therefore, cases in which the courts
have had opportunity to apply general principles, unhampered by
the necessity of conceding validity to the decrees in order to avoid
injustice to private litigants.2 5
In the case of Jamws and Co. v. Second Russzan Reinsuraicc
Co.,2 6 the defense to an action for recovery on an insurance policy
was a contention by the insurance company that its existence as a
corporation, and its obligations, had been terminated by the Soviet
nationalization decrees of 1918. The New York supreme court
rejected the contention on the ground that the decrees of the Soviet
Government could have no validity in the courts of the United
States, because that government had not been recognized by the
United States. This decision was affirmed by the appellate divi-
sion, and by the court of appeals, 7 but by the latter on the further
ground that "Justice and public policy do not require that the
defendant now before us shall be pronounced immune from stu-t."
Considering that
Journal de Droit International 51. See also, Gemma, Scipione, "Les
Gouvernements De Fait et le Droit Prive," Academic De Droit Inter-
national: Recueil Des Course, 1924, III., Tome 4 de la Collection, p. 392.
See also Habicht, Max, "The Application of Soviet Laws and the
Exception of Public Order," 21 Am. Jour. Int. Law 238. For cases in
which the Tribunal of Athens held the Soviet Nationalization Decrees
to be void, as contrary to the Greek public order, see 52 Journal du
Droit International 1111, 1143 (1925). See also In re Federazione
Italiana dei consorzi agrari di Piagenza v. Commissariato per il com-
merco estero della Republica Socialista lei Soviet di Russia ed altri
(1923), 51 Journal du Droit International 257 (1924), for a similar de-
cision of the civil court of Rome.
2iSee infra.
28(1924) 210 App. Div. 82, 205 N. Y S. 472.
27(1925) 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369.
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"Far from suspending its activities since the promulgation
of the decree which is said to have ended its existence, it has since
then written policies of insurance covering millions of dollars of
risks, has collected premiums in large amounts, and by the admis-
sions of its answer is doing business today [in the state of New
York]," the court refused to "declare its death as a means to the
nullification of its debts."
The court strongly intimated that it would probably have re-
fused to do so, even if the Soviet Government had been recognized
by the United States, stating that.
"If the Russian government had been recognized by the
United States as a government de jure, there might be need, even
then, to consider whether a defendent so circumstanced, continu-
ing to exercise its corporate powers under the license of our laws,
would be heard to assert its extinction in avoidance of a suit."
For, as was pointed out, not even a recognized government
could free a corporation of its liabilities as regards foreign credi-
tors and their recourse to foreign assets, because such an action
would have no extraterritorial effect.2
In July, 1924, the British House of Lords rendered two de-
cisions which have affected the attitude of American courts some-
what as to the design and effect of the Soviet nationalization de-
crees. The Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank and the
Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd were joint stock
compames orgamzed under the Russian Law, several years before
the Revolution. Their main offices were in Petrograd, but they
maintained branches in London, Paris, and elsewhere. The mana-
gers of the-branch banks held a power of attorney from the cor-
porations, giving them large powers, including the right to sue in
the name of their corporations.
In December, 1917, and January, 1918, the Soviet decrees
nationalizing Russian banking and confiscating the property of the
corporations in Russia, were issued.2 9  In suits brought in the
British courts by the London branch of the Russian Commercial
and Industrial Bank, and by the Paris branch of the Banque In-
ternationale de Commerce de Petrograd to recover certain moneys
28For analysis ana discussion of the Soviet legal system, see
Kantorovitch, J., "The Civil Code of Soviet Russia," 32 Yale L J. 779"
and, Komar, B. M., "Legal System of Soviet Russia," 10 Am. Bar
Assn. J. 349, 434; and, Zaitzeff, L., "The Legal Position of Foreigners
in Soviet Russia," 24 Mich. L. Rev. 441.
See also Bourne v. Bourne, (1924) 209 App. Div. 419; 204 N. Y. S.
866; (1925) 240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180.29For the texts of these decrees see Sen. Doc. No. 62 (Sen. Docu-
ments, Vol. IV), 66th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 3 p. in. 1236.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and security bonds, the defendants set up as a defense, the con-
tention that, the Soviet nationalization decrees being valid in the
courts of Great Britain, 30 therefore, the plaintiff corporations had
not been in existence since 1918, and so no suit could be brought
in their names. This contention was sustained by the Court of
Appeal in 1923, but the decisions were reversed by the House of
Lords in 1924,31 holding that the effect of the decrees was not to
dissolve joint stock companies such as the plaintiff banks, what-
ever effect they may have had in depriving them of their assets and
managements. Their Lordships considered that a perusal of the
terms of the decrees was conclusive of the fact that they did not
have either the design or the effect of dissolving such corporations.
It was pointed out that after the decrees went into operation the
London branch continued to communicate and do business with the
Petrograd office, the management of which clearly continued to
recognize the London branch as a branch of the Petrograd institu-
tion, with no breach of continuity 32 And it was held that the
London and Paris branches could bring suit in the names of the
Petrograd institutions.33
In the case of Joint Stock Co. v. Natwnal City Bank,3 4 the
plaintiff, a Russian corporation incorporated under the laws of the
Imperial government, had deposited certain funds with the defen-
dant bank. In a suit by the plaintiff to recover these funds, the
30After recognition by Great Britain of the Soviet Government as
a de facto government.31Russian Commercia and Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte
de Mulhouse, [1923] 2 K. B. 630; 92 L. J. K. B. 1053; and, [1925] A. C.
112. Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassou,
[1923] 2 K. B. 682, 92 L. J. K. B. 1079; and, [1925] A. C. 151.32The Petrograd management signed itself as "Formerly the Rus-
sian Commercial and Industrial Bank, Liquidating Committee," or
described itself as a "branch of the State bank."13A similar decision was rendered on March 3, 1925, by the Prus-
sian Kammergericht, Jurxstische Woclienschrift, (1925) H. 11, p. 1300.
See 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 386.
But see Banque internationale de commerce de Petrograd v.
Housner, (1924) 52 Journal du Droit International 488, for a contrary
decision by the Court of the Swiss Confederacy, (Tribunal Federal)
on December 10, 1924, ignoring the decisions of the British House of
Lords and of the New York Court of Appeals (see next paragraph),
even though Switzerland had not recognized the Soviet Government.
See also Wohl, Paul, "The Nationalization of Joint Stock Banking
Corporations in Soviet Russia and its Bearing on Their Legal Status
Abroad," 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 385ff., 527ff., 622ff., for a full discussion
of the matter, in which it is submitted that the effect of the Soviet Na-
tionalization decrees was to terminate, to all intents and purposes, the
separate existence of Russian banking companies.
34(1925) 240 N. Y 368, 148 N. E. 552.
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bank denied the existence of the corporation because of the Soviet
nationalization decrees.
From a judgment granted by the New York supreme court,
and affirmed by the appellate division,3" on- the grounds of the
insufficiency of defendant's answer and the illegality in the courts
of the United States of acts of the unrecognized Soviet Govern-
ment, defendant appealed. The court of appeals, on authority of
the Mulhouse and Goukassou Cases,"8 affirmed the decision, on the
ground that the effect of the Soviet decrees was not to destroy the
identity of the plaintiff corporation, even if they should be given
full force. Mr. justice Crane, in delivering the opinion of the
court, gave it as his personal opinion that the decrees of the un-
recognized Soviet Government ought not to be given any recogm-
tion by the courts in the United States. But, since that question
was not necessarily involved in a decision of the case, the point
was not decided by the court of appeals.37
In the case of Moscow Maclhne, Tool, and Engine Co. v.
.Richard and Co.,38 decided at the tune of the decision in the Joint
Stock Company Case, the court of appeals affirmed decisions by
the New York supreme court and the appellate division, permitting
the plaintiff a corporation organized under the laws of Russia
prior to 1914, to sue and recover certain funds, which were the
balance due upon the proceeds of a sale by defendant, under a lien,
of certain property belonging to plaintiff, though in this case, as in
the other, the court of appeals did not find it necessary to decide
upon the question of the validity of the Soviet decrees.39
THE VALIDITY OF THE AcTS OF OTHER UNRECOGNIZED GovERN-
MENTS IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
It has been urged that the courts of a non-recognizing state
should give effect to the laws and acts of an unrecognized govern-
men whenever occasion arises, as the laws and acts of a sovereign
35(1924) 210 App. Div. 665, 206 N. Y. S. 476.36Discussed and cited supra, note 31.
37See, however, Matter of Salamandra Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, (1924)
209 App. Div. 871, and, Honnenlotter v. Ndrwich Union Fire Ins. Co.,
(1924) (124 Misc. Rep. 626), 207 N. Y. S. 588.
38(1925) 213,App. Div. 815; (1925) 240 N. Y. 707, 148 N. E. 768.
39For other cases involving the status of the acts of the unrecog-
nized Soviet Government, see In re City Equitable, (1924) 238 N. Y.
147, 144 N. E. 484; In re Norske Lloyd, (1925) 242 N. Y. 148, 151
N. E. 159; In re Second Russian Ins. Co., (1926) 243 N. Y. 524, 154
N. E. 590.
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state.4 0 And, the courts have given expression to the principle that
the courts of one state will not sit in judgment on the acts of a
foreign state done within its own territory 42 But, that the acts
of an unrecognized government in a foreign state constitute per se
the acts of the sovereign state, so as to be required to be given effect
in the courts of a non-recognizing state, has not been generally
conceded.
42
In the case of Oetlen v Central Leather Co.,43 the Carranza
government had been recognized by the United States before the
final decision of the case. And, in Luther v. Sagor,4 the court
definitely held the decrees of the unrecognized Soviet Government
not to be valid in England.
In the case of Underhill v Hernandez,41 Mr Chief Justice
Fuller of the United States Supreme Court, delivering the opinion
of the Court, stated that
"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves."
Continuing Chief Justice Fuller stated, "nor can the principle
be confined to lawful or recognized governments, or40 to cases
where redress can manifestly be had through public channels."
This language, when cited alone, 47 seems to indicate that the
court laid down the principle that all acts of an unrecognized gov-
ernment done within its own territory are beyond question by the
courts of the United States. But the fact is that the revolutionary
government in Venezuela, of which Iernandez was, in 1892, the
4OHarriman, E. A., "The Recognition of Soviet Russia," 18 Proc.
Am. Soc. Int. Law 94; Fraenkel, 0. K., 'The Juristic Status of For-
eign States, Their Property and Their Acts," 25 Col. L. Rev. 544, es-
pecially pp. 563, 569.
4See, for example, Underhill v. Hernandez, (1897) 168 U. S. 250,
18 Sup. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., (1918)
246 U. S. 297 38 Sup. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726; Luther v. Sagor, [1921]
3 K. B. 532, 90 L. J. K. B. 1210.
42As a matter of fact, the laws of the several states of the United
States have not always been given effect by the courts of the other
states. See the case of Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Richards,
(1887) 68 Tex. 375.
43(1918) 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726.
44[1921] 1 K. B. 456, 90 L. J. K. B. 1202.
45(1897) 168 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456.
46rtalics, the author's.
47See Fraenkel, "The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Pro-
perty and Their Acts," 25 Col. L. Rev. 544, 555.
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military representative in the area in which Underhill was residing,
and for whose acts Underhill sought to obtain judicial redress,
actually became the established government of Venezuela,8 and
was recognized as such by the United States in October, 1892,
which fact was really largely relied upon by the court as a basis
for the decision.
But, in the case of O'Neill v. Central Leather Co., 9 the New
Jersey court of errors and appeals, in 1915, held that confiscation
of property in pursuance of a properly levied military contribution
by the forces of the Carranza government during its revolutionary
period was valid, on the ground that an actual state of war existed,
even though the Carranza government had not been recognized by
the United States. And, the sale of confiscated property by the
revolutionary forces was held, therefore, to convey good title. It
may be significant that tis decision came before the United States
recognized the Carranza government, and so, is not confused with
the question of the retroactive effect of recognition."
It has been pointed out that, with respect to the validity of
the laws and acts of the Confederate governments, the courts of
the United States, upon the restoration of their authority in that
area, made a distinction between the laws and acts of the several
Confederate state governments and those of the Confederate cen-
tral government, holding, in general, the acts of the former, when
not in aid of the rebellion, to be valid, while regarding all acts of
the latter to be null and void. It has been further indicated that, in
general, the courts of the United States, like those of France and
England, have not adopted a general policy of giving legal effect
to the laws of unrecognized foreign governments.
With respect to the decrees of the Soviet Government, while
the lower courts in the United States have not hesitated to hold
them invalid on the basis of non-recognition, the higher courts
have, m the cases so far considered, not deemed it necessary to
pass definitely upon that question, finding other grounds for de-
ciding the cases. That is, the courts have not m these cases con-
48The Crespo government.
49(1915) 87 N. J. L. 552, 94 AtI. 789.5OIn the case of Cia Minera Ygacio Dodriguez Ramos, S. A. v.
Bartlesville Zinc Co., (1925), 115 Tex. 21, 275 S. W 388, the supreme
court of Texas refused to give effect to confiscation decrees issued by
General Villa in his revolutionary movement against Carranza, on the
ground that his revolution being unsuccessful, its acts were all invalid;
and, therefore, purchase of confiscated ore from Villa did not give
good title.
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sidered it to be essential to justice to hold the Soviet decrees either
valid or invalid. 51 It yet remains, however, to consider the ques-
tion of the attitude of the courts in cases involving private rights,
in which justice requires that de facto character, in greater or
lesser degree, be conceded to unrecognized governments.
II
THE PRACTICE OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN COURTS WITH RESPECT
TO THE STATUS OF PRIVATE RIGHTS, TIlE ADJUDICATION OF
WHICH INVOLVES CONCESSION OF DE FACTO CHARACTER
TO UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS-THE ArTITUDE
OF THE EXECUTIVE
It has already been pointed out that, generally speaking, the
courts of the United States and those of England consider them-
selves bound by the attitude of the executive with respect to the
political status of foreign governments, and that, in general, the
courts do not consider as valid, laws, acts, or decrees of a foreign
government which has not been recognized by the executive au-
thority It sometimes happens, however, that, in order to avoid
flagrant injustice in cases involving only private rights of persons
or corporations, the courts are called upon to concede de facto
character52 to an unrecognized foreign government. And, although
the courts have been subjected to some criticism for their con-
servatism in this respect, 3 yet, it does appear that both the British
and the American courts have attempted to avoid mjustce54 Which
might follow from a rigid and unbending adherence to their gen-
eral policy of following the determination of de facto character
by the executive branch of their own government, in private rights
cases, which do not involve danger of international complications.
That is, in some such cases, they have accepted idezdncc of de
51Though, as has been pointed out, the New York court of ap-
peals, in affirming the decisions of the lower courts in the cases here
discussed, did not indicate any disagreement with the proposition
that the Soviet decrees were invalid in the courts of the United States.
It did not, however, rely solely upon that doctrine.52By "de facto character" is meant the power legally to act for the
state.53See Connick, L., "The Effect of Soviet Decrees in American
Courts," 34 Yale L. J. 499- and Dickinson, E. D. in 22 Mich. L. Rev
129-34.
54Though, as indicated earlier, justice may at times depend upon
a refusal of the courts to give effect to the laws of an unrecognized
government.
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facto character, in the absence of recognition and when it has not
appeared that the executive would be opposed to such a policy.
EARLY PRACTICE
Thus in the case of United States v. Rice," the United
States Supreme Court held that the military government, which
had collected the taxes in question, possessed de facto character to
the extent of validating its action in collecting revenue. The case
being one between the United States and private persons in-
volving no danger of international political complications, to have
refused to concede de facto character simply because the military
government had not been recognized by the United States, would
have been an obvious injustice to the persons who had paid the
duties to the de facto authorities.
In the case of Yrtsarr v. Clenwt,56 a suit for libel was
brought by the plaintiff against Clement, a private citizen in
England, in 1825. Plaintiff cimed that matter damaging to
Ins reputation had been published concerning Is activity in try-
ing to raise a loan for Chile, of which he claimed to be the duly
appointed diplomatic representative. It was objected that Chile
was a Spanish colony, and as such, could not be an independent
state with a diplomatic representative. Evidence was offered to
prove that Chile was an independent state, though it had not at
the time of the alleged libel been recognized by the British gov-
ernment. The defendant objected that in the absence of recogni-
tion by the Crown, the court was bound to consider Chile a Spanish
colony. In this connection Chief Justice Best, of the Court of
Common Pleas, said.
"It occurs to me at present that there is a distinction. If
a foreign state is recognized by tus country, it is not necessary to
prove that it is an existing state, but if it is not so recognized,
such proof becomes necessary"
Continuing, he indicated that the actual existence of Chile
as an independent state would be sufficient evidence, for the pur-
poses of the case at bar. On appeal, however, the case was de-
cided on the basis that the defendant, in the alleged libelous mat-
ter, had referred to Chile as a state, wich was held to make proof
of independence unnecessary, since the matter being adjudicated
s5(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 246, 4 L. Ed. 562.
55(1825) 2 C. & P 223.
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was not the question of the international status of Chile, but a
libel suit between two persons."
The case of Keene v McDonough,;" decided in 1834 by the
United States Supreme Court, was a suit concerning the title to
certain lands in Lomisiana, and involved the validity of an ad-
judication of a Spanish court made after the cession o the region
to the United States, but before the United States had ac dly
taken possession. The court held that,
"The adjudication having been made by a Spanish tribunal,
after the cession of the country to the United States, does not
make it void, for we know, historically, that the actual possession
of the territory was not surrendered until some time after these
proceedings took place. It was the judgment, therefore, of a coin-
petent Spanish tribunal, having jurisdiction of the case, and ren-
dered whilst the country, although ceded, was de facto, n the pos-
session of Spain, and subject to Spanish laws. Such judgments,
so far as they affect the private rights of the parties thereto, must
be deemed valid."
PRACTICE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONFEDERATE STATES
In a number of cases which came before the United States
Supreme Court following the Civil War, it was necessary to de-
termine the matter of the de facto character of the insurrectionary
state governments, in order properly to decide the questions of
private claims based upon contracts and arrangements which had
been made under authority of those governments. And, although
those governments had not been recognized in any degree by the
government of the United States, beyond the concession to the
armed forces of that region of belligerent rights, for humanitarian
reasons,5 9 yet, it was the general practice of the court to hold,
that, for purposes of determining private rights, the governments
of the individual insurrectionary states possessed de facto charac-
ter, in so far as their acts were designed to provide for the ordi-
nary affairs of civil government of the people, and in so far as
they were not intended or designed to promote the rebellion or to
subvert the rights of citizens of the United States under the Con-
stitution of the United States.
In the case of United States v. Home Insurance Co.,60 a
corporation, established under an act of the Georgia legislature
57(1825) 2 C. & P 223, 229.
58(1834) 8 Pet. (U.S.) 308, 8 L. Ed. 955.59See Williams v. Bruffy, (1878) 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716 and
Hickman v. Jones, (1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 197, 19 L. Ed. 551.
80(1875) 22 Wall. (U.S.) 99, 22 L. Ed. 816.
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during the Civil War, was held by the court of claims of the
United States to have been lawfully created, and thus to be eligi-
ble to sue in that court for the recovery of the proceeds of certain
cotton which had been seized by the military forces of the United
States during the War. Upon appeal by the United States, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of claims.
Adverting to the principle, referred to above, of the general validity
of the acts of the several Confederate state governments designated
to promote the orderly affairs of civil society, the court stated
that:
"Any other doctrine than this would work great and unnec-
essary hardship upon the people of those states, without any cor-
responding benefit to the citizens of other states, and without any
advantage to the National Government.""'
In accord with this principle, the contracts and transactions
between citizens, corporations, or municipalities entered into in
the ordinary course of civil life and based upon the laws of the
states, were, when not in direct aid of the rebellion, generally held
to be valid.62 Even contracts stipulating payment in Confederate
currency were held to be valid, on the ground that Confederate
currency was forced upon the inhabitants of the Confederate
states and made a legal tender, constituting practically the ex-
clusive currency of the secession area. Pointing out that,
"As contracts in themselves, except in the contingency of
successful revolution, these notes were nullities," the United
States Supreme Court stated that, "While the war lasted, how-
ever, they had a certain contingent value, and were used as money
in nearly all the business transactions of many millions of people,"
and that "They must be regarded, therefore, as a currency un-
posed on the community by irresistible force."8 3
611t seems that even in the event that a government, which suc-
ceeds a de facto government, sees fit to nullify the acts of the de facto
authorities, it is deemed necessary to except many of the acts which
have to do with the orderly conduct of the civil life of the people. For
example, the Costa Rican government which followed the Tinoco re-
gime expressly gave validity to the judicial proceedings of the civil
courts and to contracts between private persons based upon the laws
in force at the time, though in general the acts of the Tinoco govern-
ment were declared to be invalid. See App. to Costa Rican Case, pp.
385, 386, British-Costa Rican Arbitration, 1923.
62See Keppel v. Petersburg R., (C.C.Va. 1868) Chase 167, Fed.
Cas. No. 7722; Horn v. Lockhart, (1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 570, 21 L.
Ed. 657;.Tucker v. Homer, (1873) 28 Ark. 335; Dinwiddie Co. v. Stuart,(1877) 28 Grat. (Va.) 526.
63Thormgton v. Smith, (1839) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 1, 19 L. Ed. 361. See
also, Delmas v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., (1872) 14 Wall. (U.S.)
661, 20 L. Ed. 757.
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Although contracts in direct aid of the rebellion were held
to be invalid when authorized by the laws of the insurrectionary
state governments, yet bona fide contracts, made in the ordinary
course of business transaction, were held to be valid, even though
it appeared that the indirect result of such contracts was to aid
the rebellion. In the case of Baldy v. Hunter,4 the United States
Supreme Court held a bona fide investment by a guardian, of
certain funds belonging to his ward, in Confederate bonds, to
have been a valid transaction, interpreting the situation as one in
which
"The guardian had in view only the best financial interests
of the ward in the situation in which both were placed, and that
he was not moved to make the investment with the purpose in
that way to obstruct the United States in its efforts to suppress
armed rebellion."
And an effort to recover the amount so invested, from the
estate of the guardian failed. 5
RECENT PRACTICE
In the case of Pelzer v. United Dredging Co.,"0 the New
York appellate division held that a person who had been appointed
administratnx of an estate in Mexico by order of a Mexican
court during the period when the Obregon government had not
been recognized by the United States, could not sue in the courts
of New York in her capacity as administratrix of the estate. The
court stated that
"The administratrix plaintiff is an officer of a foreign court.
She exercises her function ex wgore the government of her
origin, and has no separate existence such as an executor has
through the appointment of a testamentary script. The for-
eign court is erected in Mexico, whose present government is not
yet admitted to recognition as a sovereign by our federal au-
thority The Mexican government is not de facto here, since
recognition alone can make it so. It may have all the attributes
of a ruling faction, a colony, a district of people, or maintain any
other form of suzerainty in its established domain, but its power
as a government remains nil without our patent of recognition.
As the parent of the court it cannot have notice, either judicial
64(1897) 171 U. S. 388, 18 Sup. Ct. 890, 43 L. Ed. 208.
05For cases, however, in which investments in Confederate bonds
were held to have been illegal as being in direct aid of the rebellion,
see, Hanauer v. Woodruff, (1873) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 439, 21 L. Ed. 224;
and Lamar v. Micou, (1884) 112 U. S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751.
And see also Williams v. Bruffy, (1878) 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716,
66(1922) 200 App. Div. 646, 193 N. Y. S. 676.
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or administrative, and surely the creature cannot be possessed of
a power not given its creator. 8 67
It does not appear that any cases have yet been before the
courts of the United States involving adjudicating the rights of
parties under a contract made in Russia durnun the Soviet regime,
and, therefore, requiring a decision as to the validity of Soviet
law regulating such matters.68  Such cases as have been decided
have had to do with the effect of the existence of the Soviet
government and its decrees upon contracts and relations existing,
for the most part, prior to the decrees.
In the case of Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry Co. v.
American Can Co.,"9 a certificate, issued by Secretary Lansing on
May 8, 1918, was accepted by the United States district court for
the southern district of New York, as conclusive of the fact that
Boris Bakhmeteff was to be considered the duly recogmzed ambas-
sador of Russia, though several months earlier the Kerensky gov-
ernment, which had accredited Bakhmeteff, had been overthrown.
The court, thereupon, accepted Mr. Bakhmeteff's certificate as
conclusive of the fact that the old Imperial Russian Supply Com-
mittee, organized in 1915 for the purpose of purchasing war
supplies in the United States, had continued until March 1, 1918,
to be possessed of official authority of the State of Russia with
power to make settlements of obligations owed to Russia. And the
defendant was required to make payment of certain funds which
it owed to the State of Russia, and which it objected to paying
over to the plaintiff70 because of danger, that, in the future, the
Soviet Government, which had not authorized the Supply Com-
mittee to act on behalf of Russia, or some succeeding government,
nught sue for a second payment. The court, considering the state-
ment of the executive to be binding upon the judiciary, stated
that, "no tribunal in this country will ever subject defendant to
a second payment-and we have no concern with remote possi-
bilities as to action of any foreign tribunal."71 Thus, while a
67This decision has been criticised as being "perhaps the extreme
limit of the absurdities flowing from the refusal to validate domestic
acts of de facto states (governments)." See 25 Col. L. Rev. 567 See
also 22 Mich. L. Rev. 31.6sSee 38 Harv. -L. Rev. 821.69(DC.N.Y. 1918) 253 Fed. 152.70Upon arrangement made by the Supply Committee before March
1, 1918.,71This part of the decision was sustained by the circuit court of
appeals of the second judicial circuit in 1919, though the case was
remanded to the lower court on other grounds. Agency of Canadian
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concession of de facto character by the court to the unrecognized
Soviet government was rendered difficult, if not impracticable, in
this case, by the definite position of the executive, it was also made
unnecessary as a protection of private rights, for the same reason,
at least so far as the courts of the United States are concerned.
In the case of Sokoloff v. Nat-onal City Bank,7 2 it was sought
to recover the balance due on a deposit made by the plaintiff in
New York, repayment to have been made in rubles by the Petro-
grad branch of the New York corporation. The defendant con-
tended that the court should take judicial notice of the closing of
the Petrograd branch and the confiscation of its assets by the
Soviet government, thus rendering performance of the contract
impossible. The plaintiff argued that the court could take no
judicial notice of the unrecogmzed government or of its acts.
The New York supreme court, while refusing to consider the
Soviet government as "sovereign, and therefore possessing power
to confiscate property or debts, as must be done in respect of a
foreign state which has been recogmzed either de facto or de jure,"
stated that, "it does not follow that we must assume a state of
anarchy in Russia." And Mr. Justice Ford, speaking for the court,
admitted that, so far as the issues in that particular case were
concerned, he could "see no valid objection to permitting the de-
fendant to allege and prove upon trial the actual conditions pre-
vailing in that great country," where, he stated that, as a "matter
of common knowledge," a government had been functioning
for several years, since, "Facts are facts, in Russia the same as
elsewhere."
The court, considering then, that the completion of the
performance of the contract in Russia by the defendant, having
been rendered impossible by the closing and confiscation of the
assets of the Petrograd branch by the Soviet government, held
that, under the doctrine of frustration, plaintiff should not recover
the balance of the New York deposit. But the decision of the
supreme court was reversed by the appellate division, 3 and upon
appeal, the court of appeals 7' affirmed the decision of the appellate
division, holding the bank liable as an American corporation,
Car & Foundry Co. v America Car Co., (C.C.A. 2d cir. 1919) 258 Fed.
368. 72(1922) 120 Misc. Rep. 252, 199 N. Y S. 355; (1924) 208 App. Div.
627, 204 N. Y. S. 69; (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917
13(1924) 208 App. Div. 627, 204 j. Y S. 69.
74(1924) 239 N. Y 158, 145 N. E. 917
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whose existence could not be terminated by any Russian gov-
ernment, recognized or unrecognized. The obligation of the de-
fendant was held to be "not changed by the fact that the property
of the Russian branch has been scattered or despoiled."
So, as finally disposed of, the case did not involve a decision
as to the validity of the Soviet decrees. Though, in the course
of his opinion, Mr. Justice Cardozo did suggest the
"possibility that a body or group of men which has vindicated
by the course of events its pretensions to sovereign power, but
which has forfeited by its conduct the privileges or immunities
of sovereignity [i.e., an unrecognized de facto government], may
gain for its acts and decrees a validity quasi-governmental, if
violence to fundamental pnnciples of justice or to our own pub-
lic policy might otherwise be done."
Similarly, in the case of Jamcs and Co. v. Sccond Russian
Reinsurance Co.,"s the New York Court of Appeals intimated
that, if it were essential to justicc or to public policy, effect would
be given to decrees of the Soviet Government. Judge Cardozo
stated that:
"The decree of the Russian Soviet government nationalizing
its insurance companies has no effect in the United States unless
it may be to such extent as justice and public policy require that
effect be given."
And, in connection with a contention on the part of the de-
fense that the British-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921 had the
effect of extinguishing the obligations of the defendant, the
court said.
"We pass the question whether such an agreement, if made,
would be disregarded by our courts because of our refusal to
recognize the existence as a government of one of the parties to
the compact. We assume, though we are not required to decide,
that if the compact existed we would not treat it as a nullity "70
The plaintiff in the case of Russian Rensurancc Co. v.
Stoddard7 7 was a corporation incorporated in Russia under the
Imperial Government. Before the revolution, it had deposited
certain securities and funds with Stoddard, as trustee, according
to the requirements of the laws of New York, for the protection
of its policy-holders and creditors. Its old board of directors,
meeting in Pans, authorized an action to compel the return of
the funds, the last policy of the company in New York having
75(1925) 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369.
7GBut, it was held that the trade agreement did not establish any
such situation nor contemplate doing so.
.7(1925) 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703.
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matured. The defendant, while not denying responsibility as
trustee, resisted the action on the ground that, because of the
nationalization decrees of 1918, the corporation as such had ceased
to exist, and that he would be liable later to suit for recovery of
the fund by the stockholders or by the Soviet Government as
confiscator
The bill was dismissed by the New York supreme court, and
plaintiff appealed. The appellate division18 reversed the decision,
and defendant appealed. Though the court of appeals held that
it could not concede legal validity to the decrees of the Soviet
Government because it had not been recognized by the United
States, yet it refused to take jurisdiction of the case and reversed
the judgment of the appellate division on the grounds,-
1. That, irrespective of the legal status of the acts of the
unrecognized Soviet Government, from the American point of
view, the effects of the actual state of affairs in Russia upon the
private rights of persons affected thereby could not, or at least,
ought not, in the absence of involvement of international political
complications, be ignored,
2. That the action of the Soviet authorities had at least made
it impossible for the plaintiff corporation, even if legally still in
existence, to function in Russia or to maintain its organization
according to the terms of its charter;
3. That the authority of the persons who, at the meeting in
Paris, had authorized the bringing of the suit might well be ques-
tioned as not being that of a legal board of directors, because
their terms had long since expired, and because in France the
Soviet decrees were considered valid ;79
4. That, therefore, to permit them to recover the trust fund
might be to expose the defendant to later suit on the trust, and,
5. That the court could not protect the defendant against
such later suit in some other jurisdiction.
Mr Justice Lehman, in delivering the opinion of the court,
stated that
"In the present case the primary question presented is not
whether the courts of this country will give effect to such decrees
[of the unrecognized Soviet Government], but is rather whether
within Russia, or elsewhere outside of the United States, they
have actually attained such effect as to alter the rights and obli-
gations of the parties in a manner we may not in justice disre-
78(1924) 211 App. Div. 132, 207 N. Y S. 574.
79After recognition by France.
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gard, regardless of whether or not they emanate from a lawfully
established authority. Though we might say that for us such
decree is not the law even of the country which the Soviet gov-
ernment rules, yet it is enforced as the law of that country and
is recognized as the law of that country by other great nations."'
The right of the directors to represent the corporation, even the
existence of that corporation, must be determined in accordance
with the law of Russia. For us the law of Russia, in its strict
sense, may still be the lav as it existed when the Czar ruled,
for other nations the law of Russia is the law sanctioned by the
Soviet Republic. Our view of what is the law of Russia rests
upon a juridical conception not always in consonance with fact,
in other nations recognition has brought juridical conceptions and
facts into harmony Do these juridical conceptions require us
to hold that the law of Russia has remained unchanged since
December, 1917, that the Soviet Republic does not e.xist, and,
therefore, cannot act; that the plaintiff corporation still lives and
is domiciled in Russia and is under the management of its former
directors, though we know that its property in Russia has been
sequestrated, its directors driven into exile, its business monopo-
lized by an agency which enforces its decrees as if it were a
government and is recognized as a government by most of the
countries of Europe? If the logical application of juridical
conceptions leads to this result, then we should consider its prac-
tical consequences to determine whether we have not been carried
beyond the 'self imposed limits of common sense and fairness.'
We shall not attempt to collate the authorities in order to deduce
from them a new general rule which will define these limits. The
very nature of the problem shows that general definitions must
hamper rather than promote its solution. The facts of each case,
the result of each possible decision, determines whether that de-
cision accords with common sense and justice."
Mr. Justice Crane dissented,"' stating that he considered the
decision of .the majority as giving effect indirectly to the Soviet
decrees, even though it refused to give direct legal effect to them.
He submitted that no effect should be given to the decrees, and
that, therefore, the old directors of the corporation should be
entitled to possession of the funds, since he saw no possible way
by which the stockholders might bring action to recover, except
through the directors. And the danger of a second suit, he
considered too remote to be given any real weight. 2
"°Referring particularly to France, Great Britain, and Germany.SiFour judges gave the majority decision, Hiscock, C. J., Cardozo
and Pound, J. J., concurring with Lehman, J., Andrews and McLaugh-
lin, J. J., not sitting.82This case was decided in April 1925. See the opinion in the case
of Joint Stock Co. v. National City Bank, (1925) 240 N. Y. 368, 148
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It has been pointed out that in cases involving the validity of
the decrees of the unrecognized Russian Soviet Government, the
courts have not conceded their general validity, but, on the con-
trary, have indicated rather definitely, especially the lower courts,
that, in general, the Soviet decrees were not considered to have
any legal effect in the courts of the United States. It has been
shown that, though the courts have not deemed it essential to
justice in any case involving private rights to concede validity to
the Soviet decrees, yet, there has been a tendency, as indicated in
obiter dicta, to recognize, that in such cases, concession of de facto
character to the unrecognized Soviet Government, and of a mcas-
ure, at least, of legal effect to its accomplished acts, may be found
to be necessary in order to avoid obvious and arbitrary injustice to
innocent persons.
It has also been further indicated that, though there may not
appear to be an absolutely consistent and completely continuous
policy on the part of the courts, of conceding de facto character
to unrecognized foreign governments in cases involving private
rights, yet it does appear that there has been, in a considerable
number of cases, extending over a long period of time, rather
definite effort by the courts, both in England and the United States,
to avoid arbitrary injustice by conceding de facto character in
such cases, where the courts have seen no danger of international
complications or of embarrassment to the executive. Though it
may be, as it has been argued, that the time has arrived when
the courts ought more "frankly [to] take cognizance of unrecog-
nized de facto governments or states and of their capacity to
affect private rights in a great many different ways." 3
The influence upon the courts of the attitude of the executive
in such cases must not be overlooked, however. And it is to a
consideration of this phase of the question that attention is now
directed.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE EXECUTIVE TOWARD CONCESSION OF
DE FACTO CHARACTER nY TIE COURTS TO
UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS
It is, perhaps, hardly to be expected that the executive de-
partment would encourage the courts to concede de facto character
N. E. 552, in which Mr. Justice Crane gave it As his personal opinion,
obiter, that no effect should be given to the Soviet decrees.8aDickinson, E. D. 22 Mich. L. Rev. 134.
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to an unrecognized government, at any rate, certainly not to the
extent of permitting it to sue, especially, if at the time the executive
should be withholding recognition in order to induce or compel
the adoption or the discontinuance of a particular policy on the
part of the government seeking recognition. For, obviously, such
judicial recognition would render much less effective the executive
policy, and might practically defeat it.8" At any rate, an examin-
ation of the facts indicates that, generally speaking, the executive
has not adopted a policy of encouraging such action by the courts,
but has, rather, discouraged the practice in cases where it has
been deemed to be at all detrimental to executive foreign policy
In a number of cases which have been before the courts of
the United, States involving the question of the de facto character
of the Russian Soviet Government, the state department has
definitely discouraged the concession of any degree of de facto
character to that regime. This attitude has been expressed in
public statements, in direct communications to the courts, and in
correspondence with counsel. And it has been expressed in cases
involving both the right of the Soviet Government to sue and the
private rights of corporations.8 5
On May 6, 1921, the state department issued a public state-
ment m which it was urged that:
"As the United States Government has not recognized the
Bolshevik regime at Moscow as a government, extreme caution
should be exercised as to representations made by anyone pur-
porting to represent the Bolshevik Government.""8
This statement followed by several months a statement to
the United States district court for the northern district of Cal-
ifornia in the case of the Rogdat,'7 to the effect that Boris
Bakhmeteff was the duly recognized diplomatic representative of
Russia in the United States, and that neither the Soviet Govern-
ment nor any of its agents had been given any sort of recogni-
tion whatever.
In a statement for the information of the United States
district court for the southern district of New York, in the
841n this connection, see 22 Col. L. Rev. 278, and 17 Am. J. Int.
L. 745.
s5See Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. Am. Car Co.,
(D.C.N.Y. 1919) 253 Fed. 152.86See Rus. Soc. Fed. Soy. Rep. v. Cibrario, (1921) 198 App. Div.
869, 191 N. Y.-S. 543.
ST(D.C.Cal. 1920) 277 Fed. 294.
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case of Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,8 8 Secre-
tary Hughes, though conceding that the Kerensky government
had fallen, and that the Soviet Government was functioning in
Russia, clearly indicated that it was the attitude of the state depart-
ment that the courts should not concede de facto character to the
unrecognized Soviet regime. In response to an inquiry by counsel
for the defense, as to the status to be ascribed to the Soviet Gov-
ernment Mr. Hughes stated
"I may say that the United States has not recognized any
other government in Russia since the fall of the provisional gov-
ernment, to which reference is made above. The regime now
functioning in Russia, and known as the 'Soviet Regime,' has not
been recognized by the United States."8' 9
As an instance showing how guardedly and reluctantly the
executive may concede any degree of de facto character to an
unrecognized government, which concession is to be used by
the courts as a basis for judicial concession, even in a private
rights case, the statement of the British Foreign Office in the
case of Luther v. Sagor90 may be cited. His Majesty's Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, on November 27, 1920, in reply
to certain requests by plaintiff's solicitors for information as
to the status to be accorded to the Russian Trade Delegation,
which was at that time in England under the leadership of M.
Krassin, 9' stated
"I am to inform you that for a certain limited purpose [cer-
tain negotiations] His Majesty's Government has regarded Mon-
sieur Krassin as exempt from the process of the courts, and
also for the like limited purpose His Majesty's Government has
assented to the claim that that which Monsieur Krassin repre-
sents in this country is a State Government of Russia, but that
beyond these propositions the Foreign Office has not gone, nor
moreover do these expressions of opinion purport to decide dif-
ficult, and it may be very special, questions of law upon which it
may become necessary for the courts to pronounce."
And then, apparently as a further safeguard, he stated that,
"I am to add that His Majesty's Government have never officially
recognized the Soviet Government in any way "02 The King's
88(D.C.N.Y 1923) 293 Fed. 135.
89For similar statements by the state department in an earlier
hearing of the same case, see (D.C.N.Y. 1919) 293 Fed. 133. See also
The Penza, (D.C.N.Y. 1921) 277 Fed. 91 and 3 N. C. L. Rev. 88.
90[1921] 1 K. B. 456, 90 L. J. K. B. 1202.
91A representative of the then unrecognized Soviet Government.
92See also the statement of the Foreign Office in the case of The
,Xnnette,[1919] Pr. 105, 88 L. J. Pr. 107
ACTS OF UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS
Bench Division did not concede de facto character to the Soviet
Government on the basis of this statement.
It appears, however, that the executive may not necessarily
interpose an objection to a concession of de facto character
by the courts to an unrecogmzed government in all instances.
In fact, it seems that there is precedent for a policy of executive
encouragement of the courts to concede de facto charater to an
unrecognized government m cases where justice would be thereby
promoted and where there appears to be no danger of international
political complications arising from such a policy
In the case of Government of Mextco v. Fernande,03 involv-
ing the right of the unrecognized Obregon government to sue in
1923, to protect certain public monies which had been stolen from
that government by a Mexican citizen who had escaped to the
United States, the state department voluntarily presented the
following statement to the court.
"The Government of the United States'lhas not accorded
recognition to the administration now functioning in Mexico, and
therefore has at present no official relations with that adminis-
tration. This fact, however, does not affect the recognition of
the Mexican state itself, which for years has been recognized by
the United States as an 'international person' as.that term is un-
derstood in international practice. The existing situation simply
is that there is no official intercourse between the two states."
It thus appears that the state department was desirous that
in this case the court should concede de facto character to the
unrecognized Obregon government, though it may be significant
that there were pending, at that time (May, 1923) official nego-
tiations looking toward recognition, which was granted on August
31, 1923. And, for the court to have refused to permit the
Obregon government to sue to protect the funds belonging to
the Mexican state, would have resulted in a great loss to Mexico,
which, apparently, the State Department desired to avoid.06
93Decided by the superior court of Essex County, Massachusetts,
in 1923. Not reported, Discussed by Quincy Wright in 17 Am. J. of
Int. L. 743.94The court has been criticized for this decision, however, on the
ground that such decisions involve danger of international political
complications. See 17 Am. J. Int.L. 744. In this connection, see also
38 Harv. L. Rev. 620. But see 22 Mich. L. Rev. 29ff, 118ff.
It should perhaps be pointed out also in this connection that there
appears to have been-no objection by the executive to the policy of the
courts in the case of United States v. Rice, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.)
246, 4 L. Ed. 562, nor in the cases involving the concession of validity
to certain laws and acts of the Confederate state governments.
